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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
MACARIO ARELLANO,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

1

vs.

Case No.
~

8486

THE WESTERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent. )

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The facts as related in Appellant's brief are so selected
that we believe a complete restatement is necessary in order
to fairly present Respondent's position.
Appellant alleged in his complaint that he was injured
on the 31st day of March, 1954, at Dumphy, Nevada, and
that his injury was caused by the negligence of the Railroad in the following particulars:
The defendant ordered him to perform dangerous
and unsafe acts when it knew or should have known that
there were safer methods of performing the work.
1.
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2.
tools.

The Railroad failed to provide plaintiff with proper

3. The Railroad failed to provide plaintiff with a safe
place to work.
Following a pretrial, the trial judge made a pretrial
order in which he stated the following:
"1. The grounds on which the plaintiff contends that
the defendant was negligent are limited to the following:
"a. That the defendant did not furnish the plaintiff
with the proper tools and equipment for the work he was
ordered to do.
"b. That the defendant did not furnish the plaintiff
a safe place in which to work."
The evidence can be simplified by stating those things
which are undisputed. It is clear that plaintiff fell while
the section crew on which he was working was unloading
riprap from the railroad track into the adjoining culvert.
The dispute which arises concerns whether he slipped and
fell into the culvert, as testified by Mr. Charlevois, or
whether he was knocked into the culvert by rolling stones
after he had dislodged one or more of the stones on direct
order from Charlevois.
The testimony of Charlevois is simple and in substance
is as follows: While the rocks were being removed, he
observed the plaintiff to be unsteady on his feet and "told
him to get out of the way before he got hurt." He intended
that the plaintiff would step off of the rocks so that the
others could move them out of the way. "Instead of getting
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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out of the way the man walked out on the edge of the fill
* * * on the edge of the pile of the rock there, and
he stumbled * * * and turned almost completely around,
and fell down into the ditch * * *" (R. 140).
At the time plaintiff slipped he was not engaged in
the process of attempting to move a rock or rocks (R. 140).
At no time did Charlevois observe him attempting to move
any rocks (R. 141). Charlevois further stated that he at
no time instructed "Mr. Arellano to get down and move or
dislodge a rock" (R. 141).
Arellano's version of what occurred is not so simple.
In fairness to him it should be pointed out that the testimony which he gave came through an interpreter. His
testimony, as so elicited, was in substance as follows: After
the riprap was dumped from the flat car the roadmaster
told "the rest of us * * * to roll the stones" (R. 19).
He, with the others, thereupon "began to roll the stones."
He was rolling the stones with a bar which the roadmaster
told him to use (R. 22). While he was rolling the stones
he dislodged one and another one rolled and hit him in the
back and knocked him into the culvert. The spot where he
was located when the stone struck him is near the edge of
the culvert toward the east, as shown on Exhibit 3.
Later at page 24 of the record, he said : "The roadmaster made the sign, the motion to me, with his hand, to
keep on rolling the stones. I laid my bar down, because one
of the stones would not be rolled, so I seized it with my
hands to pull it; when I pulled it with my hand, the other
one became dislodged and hit me." Again at page 25, he
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sa~d

that he moved to the outer edge of the riprap when
the roadmaster told him to roll the stones and that he moved
to this position when the roadmaster said· "roll them."
,'

I'

..

Following this testimony, counsel for the plaintiff
withdrew the plaintiff from the stand and called another
witness. When the plaintiff returned to the stand, he was
again asked about moving the stones and stated that he
rolled rocks at the top of the pile for about twenty minutes
and that then the roadmaster motioned to him to keep pushing the stones (R. 44). He again reiterated that the reason
he moved from the top of the pile to the bottom of the pile
in a place which he thought was in the clear was "because
the roadmaster said to roll the stones."
After the evening recess the plaintiff was again recalled to the stand and in answer to his counsel's questions,
"rehashed" the whole incident and made significant changes
in his testimony. Instead of the roadmaster telling him to
"roll the stones," as he had testified on the previous day,
the plaintiff said that he left the top of the pile because the
roadmaster "told me to remove a stone that was blocking
it" (R. 99).
The only other person present who was called as a
witness was an Indian by the nan1e of Jerry Jackson. He
was one of the section crew moving the rocks at the time the
plaintiff was injured. He did not see the plaintiff fall but
heard somebody say "somebody going to fall." At that time
the plaintiff was near the east end of the culvert (R. 125126).

At the conclusion of the testimony the jury returned
a ve,rdict in favor of the railroad "No cause of action."
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Thereafter, the Appellant made a motion for new trial,
which was denied, and it is from this judgment and order
that Appellant appeals.
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON

I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 12.

II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 3.

III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO GIVE APPE.LLANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2.
IV.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO
SPECIFICALLY INST:RUCT, AS REQUESTED
BY APPELLANT, THAT AN EMPLOYER IS
GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE IF IT EXPOSES
ITS EMPLOYEE TO AN UNNECESSARY RISK,
AND THAT SUCH DUTY CANNOT BE DELEGATED.

v.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO
SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCT, AS REQUESTED
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BY APPELLANT, THAT THE PLAINTIFF DID

NOT ASSUME THE RISK OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AND T'HAT HE WAS NOT NEGLIGENT
IN CONTINUING TO WORK KNOWING THAT
HE WAS REQUIRED TO WORK IN A DANGEROUS OR UNSAFE PLACE.
VI.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 13 AND 14.
VII.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO GRANT APPELLANT A NEW TRIAL BY
REASON OF THE MISCONDUCT OF A JUROR.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 12.
We do not quarrel with Appellant's general proposition
that a party is entitled to have the court instruct on its
theory of the case. This, however, does not establish that
Instruction No. 12 is erroneous.
Plaintiff's theory of the case, as stated in the pretrial
order, was failure of the defendant to provide a safe place
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to work and failure to provide plaintiff with proper tools.
During the trial, plaintiff and only plaintiff, testified that
immediately prior to the time he was injured he was in the
act of loosening a stone which he had been directed to move
by defendant's roadmaster. If this. was so and if the defendant vvas negligent in requiring plaintiff to perform this
task, then defendant failed to furnish plaintiff a safe place
to work. Instruction No. 12 is directed to this point and
instructs the jury that before the defendant can be held
responsible for plaintiff's injuries by reason of the plaintiff's act of loosening the stone, the jury must find that
the defendant knew or should have known that the removal
would expose plaintiff to unreasonable risk of harm.
Failure to give such an instruction would have left
the jury free to find that defendant was liable if the plaintiff was removing a stone immediately prior to the time
he fell, without regard to whether or not defendant was
negligent. Inasmuch as there was a sharp dispute and some
emphasis placed on this issue, the jury could have believed
that all they need have found was this fact. The instruction was therefore necessary to properly present to the jury
the Ia w applicable to the evidence in the case.
Appellant does not claim that Instruction No. 12 is
not a correct statement of the law nor does Appellant cite
any law which would sustain him in such a contention. It
is difficult to understand what Appellant does claim. As
near as \Ve can determine, the instruction is objected to
because it does not contain all other theories which Appellant now claims are applicable to the issues in this case.
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In Bowden v. D. & R. G. Western Railroad Company,
3 Utah 2d 444, 286 P. 2d 240, the Utah Supreme Court sustained an instruction given by the lower court which in
substance and effect was similar to Instruction No. 12,
particularly with reference to the necessity of finding that
the defendant railroad knew or should have known that a
condition was unsafe before it could be held negligent. The
instruction was as follows :
"In order to find that the railroad was negligent
in failing to provide a safe place to work in this
case, you must find by a preponderance of the evidence that
·
·
The railroad knew, or by the exercise of
reasonable care, should have known that there was
snow or other substance near the tracks at the point
of the accident, which snow or substance created a
situation which was not a reasonably safe place for
railroad workers to work ; * * * "
" ( 1)

II.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO GIVE APPE.LLANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 3.
Appellant's proposed Instruction No. 3 is as follows:
"You are instructed that the defendant had a
statutory duty to provide its employees, including
the plaintiff, with a safe place in which to work.
This duty on the part of the defendant includes
within its n1eaning the duty to provide its e1nployees
a reasonably safe manner and place for doing the
work, and it is required to exercise reasonable care
to provide such a plan. If the defendant failed to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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exercise reasonable care to provide a reasonably
safe manner and place to do the work requited by
it, then defendant is guilty of negligence."
In support of its contention, Appellant cites the following cases:
In Fisher v. Minn and S. L. Railroad Company, 199
F. 2d 308, the court held that plaintiff's husband, who
was killed when he cut poles. loose from a loaded railroad car, could not recover because his own negligence
in performing the work was, as a matter of law, the
sole proximate cause of his death. The safe rnethod referred to in the quotes at page 17 of Appellant's brief applies to the deceased's conduct which the court held as a
matter of law was negligent.
In Jefferson v. City of Raleigh, North Carolina, 140
S. E. 76, 194 N. C. 479 (1927), there is very little reference
to the facts in the case. Apparently it involved the question
of whether or not the defendant was negligent in failing
to provide the plaintiff with goggles and the failure to
provide a shield or hood on a machine involved. The court
submitted the issue to the jury, saying:
"It was the duty of the defendant in the exercise of ordinary care to provide its servants and employees with reasonably safe places and safe tools
and appliances to work with, and to provide them
with reasonably safe methods and means to do the
work for which they are employed and in which they
are engaged."
We fail to see how these facts in any way relate to the
facts in the instant case, or to Instruction No. 3.
In A. T. & S. F. Railroad Company v. Struder, 213 F.
2d 250, the court simply held that it was a jury question as
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to whether or not it was negligent to provide a refrigerator
car for hauling long lengths of galvanized pipe instead of
a car from which the pipe could be more easily unloaded.
There were no instructions involved. The case is of no help
in this situation.
In Cahn v. S. P. Company, 282 P. 2d 78, 132 Cal. App.
410, plaintiff allegedly sustained an eye injury when a
heavy coupler fell from a pile of couplers onto the cement
where he was working causing a particle of cement to strike
his eye, dislodging the retina. The court did not discuss
instructions but merely held that from such evidence the
jury could find the railroad negligent in failing to provide
plaintiff with a safe place to work.
In Joy v. Pope, 53 P. 2d 683, 175 Okla. 540, and in Enid
Transfer and Storage Co1npany v. Mollenhauer, 251 P. 2d
1068, 207 Okla. 654, neither the facts nor the law are analogous or helpful in the instant case. In the Pope case, the
allegation of the complaint \vas as follows:
" 'Plaintiff alleges that the machinery and appliances hereinabove described and the construction
and operation thereof, in the manner herein alleged,
was highly dangerous, and 'vhich danger was not
known to plaintiff's decedent, and could not by the
exercise of ordinary care have been ascertained by
him * * * and said defendant \Yas guilty and
negligent in the Inaintenance and operation of the
machinery and appliances as herein alleged; that
the construction and operation of such machinery
and appliances, in the method and manner herein
alleged, constituted the same highly dangerous, and
said defendant wholly failed in its duty to plaintiff's
decedent as hereinabove set out.' "
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In the Enid case supra the plaintiffs plead failure to
furnish: (1) A safe place to work. (2) A safe method to
do the work. (3) Safe tools. (4) Competent and safe coworkers.
The court in sustaining a verdict returned for the plaintiff in the lower court did not consider instructions, but only
considered the question of whether there was sufficient
evidence to take the case to the jury. The most the two
foregoing cases contribute are generalities with which we
do not disagree, such as stated in the Enid case as follows:
"The duty of furnishing a reasonably safe place
in which to work, reasonably safe appliances with
which to perform the work, and reasonably careful,
prudent, and competent fellow servants, 1s a nondelegable duty of the employer."
In August v. Texas and N. 0. R. Co., 265 S. W. 2d 148,
(Texas Appellate), the trial court directed a verdict for
the defendant. The Texas Appellate Court sustained. There
was no discussion in the case regarding instructions. The
court simply held, as quoted in plaintiff's brief, that the
Railroad had a duty to provide a reasonably safe place and
method of doing work. We find nothing in this case with
which we can disagree.
In Millett v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 146 Atl. 903, 128 Me.
316, the plaintiff was injured by a flying spark while working near a field fire. His job was. to keep the fire from
spreading. At the time of injury he was walking near the
fire with a bucket of water and broom. The plaintiff
claimed this was a negligent method of doing the work.
The lower court, however, could find no evidence of negli-
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gence and refused to permit the case to go to the jury. The
Maine Court in sustaining the action of the lower court
said at page 904:
"Plaintiff had the burden to adduce reasonable
evidence which would tend to show, primarily, a
breach of duty owed to him in respect to the method
of doing the work. Negligence may not be found
from the mere happening of an accident.

*

*

*

*

"There is no evidence that the method employed
was not common and usual in the occupation."
There was no evidence in the instant case that defendant failed to supply plaintiff with a reasonable safe place
to work or n1ethod of working except as testified by plaintiff. The action which he outlined related to place of work.
This situation was completely covered by the court's instructions, particularly Instruction No. 12. Any further
instruction on method of work would not have assisted the
jury. Particularly is this so considering Appellant's failure
to introduce any evidence relative to an alternative method
of doing the work.
III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2.
Appellant's requested Instruction No. 2 is very similar
to the requested Instruction No. 3. The argument under
point II is equally applicable to the instruction here considered.
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The Appellant has cited the following cases in suppo,rt
of his contention under Point III. These cases are as follows: Boston & M. R. R. v. Meech, 1 Cir. 156 F. 2d 109;
Stone v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., 344 U. S. 407, 97 L.
Ed. 441, 73 Sup. Ct. 358; Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific
Railroad Co. v. Wright, 278 P. 2d 830, (Oklahoma); Huskey
v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., 181 S. W. 1041, 192 Mo. App.
370; Brown v. Coley, 152 So. 61, 168 Miss. 778; E. J O'Brien
& Co. v. Shelton's Adm'r., 55 S. W. 2d 352, 246 Ky. 537.
In the Meech case supra the court did not consider anything more than the sufficiency of the evidence to take the
case to the jury. The court made general statements
relative to the duty to provide a safe place to work, which
are of very little assistance in the instant case. In the Ro·ck
Island case supra the plaintiff in his pleadings alleged
negligence in the following particulars:
1.
work.

Failure to provide plaintiff with a safe place to

2. Failure to provide a reasonable safe manner or
plan for doing the work.
3.

Failure to profide adequate tools.

4.

Failure to provide sufficient help.

Evidence was introduced in support of all the above
and particularly in support of the allegation that defendant
did not provide plaintiff with a reasonable safe manner
or plan for doing the work. In this respect plaintiff produced evidence showing that the method employed in moving the rail was improper, and introduced evidence showing
a proper method of doing the work. The court found suffi-
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cient evidence to support the allegations and submitted the
case to the jury. The court did not discuss instructions.
In the Huskey case supra plaintiff introduced evidence
showing two ways of doing the work, one of which was
clearly unnecessary and unreasonable. The court, as cited
at page 27 of Appellant's brief, said :
"If two ways are open to a person to use, one
safe and the other dangerous, the choice of the dangerous way with knowledge of the danger constitutes
negligence."
In the Huskey case supra there was no discussion of
instructions. It was again simply a question of whether or
not there was sufficient evidence to take the case to the
jury. We believe that the finding of the court was proper,
but in no \Vay helpful in determining the issues before this
court.
In the Brown case supra the plaintiff was a laborer
who received burns when he poured gasoline from a bucket
into a small opening in a tank without using a funnel, and
while the motor was running. The lower court permitted
the case to go to the jury and the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed holding that there was not sufficient evidence. The court said :

" 'If the ~vork is simple in character and free
from complexities, the maste'r is under no obligation
to adopt rules. In other words, where the danger is
apparent to all, and the duty of the servants to
a void such danger is n1anifest, no rules are required.'
See also, R'eed v. Ridout's Arnbulance, 212 Ala. 428,
433, 102 So. 906.
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"The attempt of the servant without the use of
a funnel to pour gasoline out of a bucket into a small
hole in the tank, near the electrical equipment of the
engine while the engine was running was an act
which, to any sensible, adult person acquainted with
the volatile and highly inflammatory character of
gasoline, would be known to be a dangerous method,
it would be obvious. The servant admits that he
knew this; and it seems to us that it is such a fact
as would not involve any complexity or uncertainty
or obscurity to a person who had ever worked around
gasoline motors as the servant admits he had done,
not only in this service but in previous experience.
Moreover, the handling and use of gasoline have become so general, so much a part of the daily observation and experience of all adult persons, so much
a matter of conscious knowledge to all of mature age
who will open their eyes, that there could be no well
grounded basis of justice now to hold that its use,
in the manner shown in this case, involves that
which is either complex or uncertain or obscure."
This case in no way supports Appellant's position. If
anything, it argues against it.
In the Stone case supra the United States Supreme
Court by a split court reversed the decision of the Missouri
Supreme Court which held that there was not sufficient
evidence of negligence or causation to take the case to the
jury. The facts were that plaintiff, a section laborer,
claimed he injured his back while pulling a tie from under
a rail. Evidence was introduced showing other methods of
removing the tie and also evidence that at the time plaintiff
was injured the section foreman urged him to pull harder
and it was while he was pulling harder that he injured his
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back. Evidence was also introduced showing that it required· additional men to finally move the tie. The case
did not involve an instruction, but again simply involved
a question of whether or not there was sufficient evidence
to go to the Jury. The Missouri Supreme Court felt that
there was not sufficient evidence and three of the United
States Supreme Court Justices agreed. However, the majority of the United States Supreme Court Justices agreed
with Justice Douglas and held that the evidence was sufficient. How this case can possibly assist the court in determining the question involving failure to give certain
instructions is beyond our comprehension.

IV.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO
SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCT, AS REQUESTED
BY APPELLANT, THAT AN EMPLOYER IS
GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE IF IT EXPOSES
ITS EMPLOYEE TO AN UNNECESSARY RISK,
AND THAT SUCH DUTY CANNOT BE DELEGATED.
We clearly understand that an employer has a duty to
provide employees with a safe place to work, which of
course, means that the employer should not expose the
plaintiff to unnecessary risks. Appellant has cited some
case law wherein courts have held that the evidence introduced 'vas sufficient to permit a jury finding on this issue.
Such cases do not help in determining whether the court
erred in failing to give Appellant's requested Instructions
Nos. 1 to 5.
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Appellant's requested Instruction No. 1 is in effect
the same as the court's Instruction No. 12 which is patterned
after the instruction given in the Bowden case supra, wherein the court approved an instruction to the effect that the
employer is not negligent unless he knew or should have
known that the situation or place where the· employee was
working exposed the employee to unreasonable risk of harm.
Unreasonable risk of harm is simply another way of saying
unnecessary risk.

I

As herein stated the requested Instruction No. 2 relates
to a safe method of doing the work. Appellant claims that
he was ordered to remove a rock. Defendant denied this
and produced evidence that Appellant was standing at the
edge of the rock pile, and was directed to move out of
the way. The court in its Instruction No. 12 told the
jury that if they believed the Appellant's story then the
Railroad was liable, if the Railroad knew or should have
known that requiring Appellant to remove a stone, as
claimed, exposed him to an unreasonable risk of harm.
An instruction which would permit the jury to speculate about alternative methods of doing the work would
have been improper.
Appellant's requested\ Instruction No. 3 relates to "a
safe plan of work." The Appellant introduced no evidence
showing that the plan of work employed by the respondent
was unreasonable or that some other plan should have been
adopted. The only evidence in the case, as herein stated,
was whether the Appellant was moving a rock on direction
of the roadmaster or was standing on the outside edge of the
rocks and when directed to move slipped and fell. Permit-
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ting the jury to speculate about "a plan of work," would
concern the jury with an irrelevant issue without evidence
upon·which it could make a finding.
It is true that the respondent introduced some evidence to the effect that the crew were advised when they
were at the tool house prior to the time they commenced
the work that they should keep behind the rocks and \Vork
from the rail outward. The Appellant denied that such a
conversation took place.
In Brown v. Coley, supra, cited by Appellant, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that "if the work is simple in
character, the master is under no obligation to adopt rules."
Certainly moving rocks is simple. Must the railroad devise
rules and plans for such work, or is it permissible to assume
that employees are able to do such tasks on their own?
Appellant's requested Instruction No. 4 relates to safe
and efficient tools. No evidence was introduced which in
any way indicated that the Appellant was not supplied with
such tools. The only evidence on this question relates to
a bar which was supplied to the Appellant and which Appellant testified he laid on the ground prior to the time he
reached for a stone as directed by the roadmaster. The
Appellant introduced no evidence showing that a bar was
not a proper tool, and introduced no evidence showing that
other tools would have been proper under the circumstances.
To permit the jury to speculate without evidence on this
issue· would have been error.
We have· considered Appellant's requested Instruction
No. 4 because Appellant has discussed it in his brief.
Actually it is not properly before the court. The Appellant
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took no exception to the court's failure to give it at the
time he took his exception to the court's instructions.
Appellant's requested Instruction No. 5 states that the
Respondent had a "duty not to expose them [Appellant] to
any unnecessary or unreasonable risks." The only unnecessary or unreasonable risk claimed by the Appellant in this
case was the risk imposed upon him when he was allegedly
. ordered to move a stone which had become lodged. While
doing so he allegedly caused the other stones to become loose.
The court instructed on this evidence and stated in effect
that if the roadmaster so ordered the Appellant to move a
stone and if at said time the roadmaster knew or should
have known that this would expose the Appellant to an unreasonable risk of harm, then the Railroad would be negligent and liable to the Appellant. We submit that the court's
instruction was proper and that an instruction relating generally to unnecessary risk which was not applicable to evidence introduced in the case, would permit the jury to speculate and would have been improper.

v.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO
SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCT·, AS REQUESTED
BY APPELLANT, THAT THE PLAINTIFF DID
NOT ASSUME THE RISK OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AND THAT HE WAS NOT NEGLIGENT
IN CONTINUING TO WORK KNOWING THAT
HE WAS REQUIRED TO WORK IN A DANGEROUS OR UNSAFE PLACE.
We believe the Utah Supreme Court in the recent case
of Alfred Roger Moore v. The Denver and Rio Grande
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Western Railroad Company, No. 8284, (not yet reported)
clearly answered Appellant's objection wherein the court
said:
"Two instructions, requested by respondent~
were given the jury, although they are outside the
issues of the trial. There is no question but that
the statements of law contained in each were correct, but this court has held that where the instruction is extraneous to the issues and evidence of the
case, it is error for the trial court to give it. Parker
v. Bamberger, 100 Utah 361, 116 P. 2d 425.

*

*

*

*

"The Bruner case also discussed an instruction
of the same import as Instruction No. 13 in the
present case:
" 'The Federal Employers' Liability Act
provides as follows :
" 'That in any action brought against any
common carrier under or by virtue of any of
the provisions of this chapter to recover damages for injuries to * * * any of its employees, such employee shall not be held to have
assumed the risks of his employment in any
case where such injury * * * resulted in
whole or in part from the negligence of any of
the officers, agents or employees of such carrier * * * '
"In the present case, as in the Bruner case, no
issue of assumption of risk '""as raised by the pleadings or the evidence and no good purpose could have
been served by the giving of such an instruction."
As in the Moore case supra, no issue of assumption of
risk was pled or \Vas evidence relating thereto introduced.
Furthermore, the court clearly advised the jury that if plain-
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tiff was injured as he claimed the defendant was liable· if
the defendant knew or should have known that' defendant's
conduct placed plaintiff in a position where he would be
exposed to unreasonable risk of harm.

VI.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 13 AND 14.
We note before making argument hereunder that Appellant did not except to the court's failure to give Instruction No. 14. We, however, desire to make no point of this
as both Instruction Nos. 13 and 14 relate to the same subject matter.
The theory of the two requested instructions is that
(1) the jury could find that the defendant through its
roadmaster gave an order in English which the plaintiff
misunderstood and that because of this misunderstanding
plaintiff was injured, and (2) that failure to give the order
in Mexican or in some other manner constituted negligence.
We submit that so far as ( 1) above is concerned there
is no evidence from which the jury could find that plaintiff
misunderstood an order resulting in his injuries. This is
apparent from the testimony of plaintiff himself. The
following statements from the record are pertinent :
"Q. Now how did the roadmaster tell you to
roll the stones ?
"A. Told us to take the bars.
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"Q.

How did he say to take the bars, in Span-

"A.

No, in English.

ish?

And did you understand, 'take the bOJrs'?
"A. Yes, 'bar' is similar to Spanish 'bara'.

"Q.

And what did they do then?
"A. We began to roll the stones (R. 19).

"Q.

*

*

*

*

"A. When I was told to roll stones, that is
where I was, in this position, rolling with the bar.
"Q.

''A.
"Q.

"A.

'Vho told you to roll the stones?
The road master.

How did he teU you to· roll the stones?
With the bar (R. 22).

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

"A. When the road master told us to roll the
stones in there, dislodging one, another one rolled
and hit me in the back and knocked me to the spot
(R. 23).

"A. The roadmaster made the sign, the motion
to me, with his hand, to keep on rolling the stows.
I laid my bar down, because one of the stones would
not be rolled, so I seized it 'vith my hands to pull it;
when I pulled it with my hand, the other one became
dislodged and hit me.
"After the roadmaster made this motion to me
to roll the stones, I rolled it; the other one became
dislodged and hit me, and that is when I fell to this
spot I have indicated (R. 24).
(Mr. Patterson) How long did you con·
tinue to roll the rocks at the top of the pile?
"A. About 20 minutes.
"Q.
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Then what happened?
"A. Then the roadmaster motioned for me to
keep pushing the stones (R. 44).
"Q.

*

*

*

*

Why had you gone from the top of the
pile down to this place on the bottom of the pile?
"A. Because the roadmaster said to roll the
"Q.

stones.
"Q. Then when you got to the bottom of the
pile, what did you do?
"A. Then I turned the stone over.

And then what did you do?
"A. When I rolled that stone away, another
one hit me in the back" (R. 45).
"Q.

lVIr. Charlevois' testimony was as follows:
"A. I noticed that Mr. Arellano, as he started
to move these rocks, to remove these rocks-he was
very unsteady on his feet, and I told him to get out
of the way before he got hurt. V/hat I meant for
him to do was to step off to the side there, and let
these other fellows get the rocks out of the way.
"I was quite certain that the man would fall
down if he tried to maintain his footing on these
rocks.
What did you observe after you told him
to get out of the way, as to what he did and where
he went?
"A. Instead of getting out of the way, the man
walked out on the edge of the fill-walked out this
way-and walked east on the edge of the pile of
rock there, and he stumbled here, and turned almost
completely around, and fell down into the ditch here.
"Q.

*

*

*

*
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"Q. (Mr. Lewis) At the time that you say
Mr. P~rellano lost his footing and fell in the ditch,
was he engaged in the process of attempting to move
a rock or rocks?
"A. No" (R. 140).

If the jury believed Mr. Arellano's testimony they could
not believe Charlevois. The two stories are incompatable.
The jury could not have found from the evidence that when
Mr. Arellano was removing a rock he thought he was doing
so because of an order from the roadmaster. So far as the
evidence is concerned Mr. Charlevois gave an order to move
the rocks or he did not. Furthermore he told Appellant to
move out of the way or he did not. For the jury to find
that he did what he did because of misunderstanding would
be to invite speculation. The evidence offers no basis for
such a finding.
Even if it be assumed that Arellano misunderstood
because the roadmaster did not give the order in Mexican,
such fact would not show negligence. Surely a master who
sees someone in a position of peril is not negligent because
he is unable to speak a foreign tongue and shouts a warning or gives an order in English. Surely, he need not stand
in silence in such a situation until an interpreter appears.
In any event the Appellant has cited no cases so holding.
The cases which are cited seen1 to us to have no bearing on
the problem here considered.
In Leonidas v. Great Northe·rn Ry. Co., 72 P. 2d 1007,
105 Mont. 302, the facts are in no way analagous. There
was no evidence of misunderstanding. The court, in dealing
with another point, stated a general rule relative to obedience to a master's order.
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In Grant Storage Battery Co. v. De Lay, 87 F. 2d 726,
the question related to the duty of a master to caution an
employee about a hidden danger. (In this case a condition
which would cause lead poisoning.) The court announced
a general rule, quoted by Appellant, with '\Vhich we do not
disagree. It, however, has no application to the problem
here.
In Pullman Co. v. Ranshaw, 203 S. W. 122, (Texas
App.), the question was whether pleadings were sufficient.
Plaintiff alleged he was ordered by the defendant company
to remain on a pullman car, and that without his knowledge
the defendant company employed two immature Mexicans,
who could not speak English, and that these watclunen shot
him while in the process of removing him from the car.
The court, understandably, held that a cause of action was
stated.
In Fidelity Trust Co. v. Wisconsin Iron & Wire Works,
129 N. W. 615, 145 Wis. 385 (1911), one of defendant's
tanks contained a sol uti on of cyanide of potassi urn. Also
near the tank was a hose containing water from which
employees were in the habit of obtaining a drink. The defendant's superintendent placed the hose in the tank for the
purpose of syphoning off the solution. The court held that
an instruction allegedly given by the master could have been
misleading to plaintiff's decedent who went into the basement and drank the water. The court said:
"This is not the case of a master instructing his
employees concerning the dangers, attendant upon
work to be done by the latter. What would be a sufficient warning in that case might not be a sufficient warning in a case like this."
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In Richard v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 109 Atl. 88, 79 N.H.
380,. and Upton v. Conway Lumber Co., 128 Atl. 802, 81 N.
H. 489, the facts are in no way analagous, nor is there any
point in disagreeing with the general principles of law
announced therein. The same is true of Sadler v. Lynch,,
64 S. E. 2d 669, 192 Va. 257, and In Re Panasuk~ 105 N. E.
368, (Mass.) .
The other authorities taken from texts and particularly
from "Naval Leadership" (a text of the U. S. Naval Academy) , are interesting but of very little help in determining
the question raised in Appellant's brief.

VII.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO GRANT APPELLANT A NEW TRIAL BY
REASON OF THE MISCONDUCT OF A JUROR.
The trial court had before it the affidavits filed by
Appellant and observed the conduct of the witness Garcia
who testified at the special hearing relative to the alleged
misconduct and summarily held that no evidence was produced which indicated misconduct.
We submit that a reading of the affidavits filed by
Appellant and the examination of the testimony given by
Garcia will quickly convince the court that the suspicions
apparently existing in Appellant's mind about the supposed
misconduct of a juror are entirely unfounded, and unjustified.
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CONCLUSION

We respectfully submit that the Appellant in this case
has had a fair trial by a jury selected to try his case, and
that the verdict returned is in all respects a fair and proper
one and that the instructions given by the court fairly and
properly advised the jury relative to the law applicable to
the case.
Respectfully submitted,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON,

Attorneys for Respondent.
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